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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (A SERVICE FOR
RETURNING VETERANs)*-During the past five years family life in
America has been subjected to unusual strains. The repercussions of
the war, as well as the usual peacetime factors, affecting the domestic
circle have received attention of sociologists and lay writers. The legal
implications have not made such prompt appearance in published form.
Information as to that part of the impact of family dislocation
caused by war is available in many places, none the least important
being the records in the offices of legal a~sistance officers in the armed
forces, 1 of the Committees on War Work set up by the American and
the various State Bar Associations,2 and, of course; of legal aid societies. 8
The application of legal rules to family life in this country is complicated by a number of factors. Modern law, ~ven with the most up
to date administrative machinery, is inadequate to' provide a solution

* See supra, p. 899, note *·

War Department Circular No. 74; Navy Department Circular Ru 84. ,
The original Committee on National- Defense was established in 1940 [ 6 5
A.B.A. REP. 77 ff. (1940)]. Later it became the Committee on War Work [67
A.B.A. REP. 343 (1942) ]. In 1944 this committee published a COMPENDIUM OF
THE LAWS RELATING TO THE PROBLEMS OF MEN IN THE ARMED FoRCEs-SUPPLEMENT ON LAWS OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1945).
3 Reginald Heber Smith, "Legal Aid During the War and After," 31 A.B.A.J.
18 ff. (1945).
1

2
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for many human problem~. Sanctions and concepts developed by the
ecclesiastical courts of the middle ages are not necessarily effective
tools in the present stage of civilizati9n. The continuing ignorance on
the part of many lay persons that they have problems which should
receive attention of those versed in the field of law delays the search
for available help until, sometimes, it is too late. Those charged with
the promotion of justice may blame the lay public for failure to make
greater progress in fitting law to public needs. It is easy to insist that
the legal rules can hardly crystallize until public opinion is more
stabilized in its attitude toward marriage and the family. We are prone
to discuss who should make the first move toward reform instead of
accepting the challenge of a number of interesting possibilities.
In the present comment the author has undertaken to survey a
field briefly rather than to make an intensive study of any part of the
field. Sample judicial decisions and legislation during the past five
years are presented; some topics, some decisions and some legislation
are not included. Limitations of time and space have framed the subject.
/
A. Divorce
During the period under consideration judicial and legislative_
thinking in the field of divorce has been directed largely to an increase
in the variety of "grounds" for which a divorce may be granted and
to the determination of certain dramatic cases ih the field of conflict
of laws.
I. Grounds
a. Insanity. An interesting development in the "causes" upon
which a divorce may be secured is to be found in the statutes allowing
the sane spouse the privilege of remarriage provided proper arrangements are made for the care of the insane partner.4 Th}s suggests a
¾ (The reader is cautioned that the citations to statutes are not intended to be exhaustive). Ala. Gen. Acts (1943) No. 463, p. 425 (hopelessly and incurably insane
and confined for five years in an institution for the insane) ; Md. Laws ( I 941) c. 497,
p. 805 (incurabl}' insane and confined to institution for three years preceding action;
fact that incurable sworn to by two or more competent physicians--one party must be a
resident); Neb. Laws (1945) c. 101, p. 339 (incurably insane; legally confined to an
institution for the insa11e for five -Jears; testimony of three physicians); N.C. Laws
(1945) c. 755, p. 1059 (authorizes divorce on the ground of incurable insanity of a
spouse if insane spouse confined to institution for ten consecutive years, and proof of
incurable insanity by two reputable physicians) ; Texas Gen. and Spec. Laws ( I 941) c.
214, p. 383 at 384 (incurably insane and confined to an asylum for five years), noted
in 20 TEXAS L. REv. 106 (1941).
See Mohrmann v. Kob, 264 App. Div. 209, 35 N.Y.S. (2d) I (1942) (an incompetent was allowed to sue for a divorce under the New York statute), noted, 28
IowA L. REv. 367 (1943); Schneider, "Unsoundness of Mind as Ground for Di-
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slow change in the orthodox view that grounds for divorce must involve
fault 5 or guilt, or an innocent spouse, or an injury which, if the' parties
were not married, might be grounds for an action in tort or contract
or for action by criminal law. Insanity of one spouse, as a ground, suggests that unavoidable misfortune to one partner should not be allowed
to work a hardship on the other. Subject to the condition that the permanently incapacitated spouse is provided for and is not likely to become a public charge, the other should be free to remarry. This step
would seem to be in accord with the theory that the interest of the state
in marriage is based upon the desirability of protecting and encouraging stable families. Where one spouse is insane the family lacks the
necessary stability.
When the bond. between husband and wife is in fact permanently
severed, whether the cause is fault, guilt, misfortune, or failure :of
affection, there is less value and more heartbreaking effort involved in
attempting to hold together the empty shell; and it is possible to assume a variety of reasonable fact situations in which the same spouse,
denied relief may commit any one of a number of anti-social acts. At
the same time each new "ground" does make divorce easier and there
will be those who will deplore these new attempts to break down the
traditional American family. Those who believe that divorce, instead
of being a cause of marital dissolution, is rather a symptom of a more
fundamental problem will not be so alarmed.
If the law can establish a more effective working alliance with other
fields of professional endeavor, a cooperative integrated approach
promises more than a series of isolated efforts, no matter how gallant,
to search out and find solutions to such fundamental problems.
b. · Desertion. Desertion as a ground for divorce was discussed in
a New Jersey case.6 There the alleged desertion consisted not in living
in separate homes, not in refusal of sexual relations but in the husband's
insistence upon the use of contraceptives.
Impossibility of intercourse is a recognized ground for divorce or
annulm_ent under some circu!I!stances·. The fact that impotency can
be cured coupled with a refusal to cure it has been held grounds for

-

vorce: a Proposal," 1944 WJs. L. REv. 106. See also 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAws, § 72 (1932); id., Supp. 1938, pp. 43 ff.
In the related field of annulment see De Nardo v. De Nardo, 293 N.Y. 550,
59 N.E. (2d) 241 (1944) (failure to give jury a chance to decide whether the
insane plaintiff at the time of the marriage had a lucid interval was ground for a new
trial).
5 See the Symposium on the Law of Divorce, 28 lowA L. REv. 179 (1943);
McCurdy, "Insanity as· a Ground for Annulment or Divorce in English and American
Law," 29 VA.· L. REv. 771 (1943); Schneider, "Unsoundness of Mind as Ground
for Divorce: a Proposal," 1944 Wis. L. REV. 106.
6 Kreyling v. Kreyling, 20 N.J. Misc. 52, 23 A. (2d) 800 (1942), noted, 55
HARV. L. REv. 1044 _(1942); 7 UNIV. NEWARK L. REv. 192 (1942).

,
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dissolution of the marriage. Refusal of sexual relations is debatable
ground with New Jersey holding it desertion. 7
A more orthodox ruling is found in a North Carolina case.8 Here
the court was construing a statute allowing divorce, "On the application of either party" where the parties ''have lived separate and apart
for two years." The court refused to hold that discontinuance of sexual
relations, while the parties lived in the same house, was sufficient to
enable one of the parties to invoke the protection of the act.
_
The general problem of birth control would seem to be involved.
In a Virginia case 9 the offer made by the plaintiff to receive back his
wife was held to lack of good faith. Here H sued W for a limited
divorce. His bill was dismissed. He then sued for absolute divorce
and again his bill was dismissed. He then wrote W stating that he
hoped she realized her mistake and would return to him. He made
no apology and presented no excuse for his own conduct. When she
did not return he sued for divorce, alleging desertion.
The House of Lords laid down the rule in England as follows:
"The question whether a deserting spouse has reasonable cause
for not trying to bring the desertion to an end, and the corresponding question whether desertion without cause has existed for
the necessary period, must always be questions of fact, and their
determination must always depend upon the circumstances of the
particular case." 10
A Kentucky court 11 found that induction into the armed forces
within a year after wilful desertion of spouse does not necessarily preclude the granting of a divorce on the ground of one year's abandonment. The emphasis upon the intent of the deserting husband which
persisted even though he was in the armed forces seems a logical basis
for a divorce on the ground of desertion. '
c. Habitual Drunkenness and Drug Addiction. Habitual drunkenness, another illustration of misfortune as a cause for divorce, received judicial interpretation by a Minnesota court.12 The court spoke
in terms of one who by frequent periodic indulgence in intoxicating
7

Raymond v. Raymond, (N.J. Ch. 1909) 79 A. 430.
Dudley v. Dudley, 225 N.C. 83, 33 S.E. (2d) 489 (1945) .
9
• McDaniel v. McDaniel, 175 Va. 402, 9 S.E. (2d) 360 (1940), noted, 27 VA.
L. REV. 246 (1940).
1
° Cohen v. Cohen, 56 T.L.R. 597 at 597 (1940), noted, 4 MoD. L. REv. 60
(1940). See also Glenister v. Glenister, [1945] P. 30, noted, 200 L.T. 66 (1945).
11
Graham v. Graham, 299 Ky. 543, 186 S.W. (2d) 186 (1945), noted, 94
UNIV. PA. L. REv. I I I (1945). See also Davis v. Watts, 208 La. 290, 23 S. (2d) 97
(1945), noted, 6 LA. L. REV. 472 (1945).
12
Hereid v. Hereid, 209 Minn. 573, 297 N.W. 97 (1941), noted, 26 MARa,
L. REv. 104 (1942).
8
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liquor has lost the power or desire to resist alcoholic opportunity with
the result that intoxication becomes habitual rather than occasional.
This is to be contrasted with the more general rule, defining habitual drunkenness as such a fixed, irresistible custom of frequent indulgence in intoxicating liquor with consequent drunkenness as to evidence
a confirmed habit and inability to control the appetite for intoxicants,
and contemplates periodic frequency of indulgence, loss of power or
normal action and inability to resist temptation when opportunity
offers. In the Minnesota case the defendant had occasional spells of
sobriety but the court still included him in the rule laid down.
Drug addiction as a ground for divorce received legislative attention.18
d. Cruelty. Cruelty as a ground for divorce is most difficult to
define.14 A Massachusetts court recognized as cruelty, a simple beating
and held that defendant's intoxication was no defense.15 A Maryland
court 1~ dealt with a situation where the husband brought his relatives
home for prolonged visits over the objection of W. The evidence also
indicated abusive language, intoxication and accusations of infidelity.
This was held to warrant a decree.
A variety of situations called for judicial interpretation.11 But an
Oregon court seems to take a logical position in holding it ground for
a divorce when W had ceased to care for H, was sullen and hardly
spoke to him, did not want to live with him and frequently told him
so.18 An Ohio court" was faced with a situation where W failed or
refus~d to perform her household tasks was ground for divorce under
the statute.19 W insisted upon securing outside employment against
the husband's w~ll and, it was alleged, became irritable and unpleasant.
The court held that while the allegations set forth a cause of action,
the proof fails to bear them out.
e. Separation. A further step ~n the liberalizing of divorce is taken
when "separation" becomes a ground.20 Separation, in effect, is incom13 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws, § 73 (1932); Afa. Gen. Acts (1943)
No. 463, p. 425.
14
"The Relativity of Conjugal Cruelty," 74 N.Y. L. REv. 130 (1940).
15
Mooney v. Mooney, 317 Mass. 433, 58 N.E. (2d) 748 (1944).
16
Poole v. Poole, 176 Md. 696, 6 A. (2d) 243 (1939), noted, 5 Mo. L. REV.
l II (1940).
17
For example, Teague v.'Teague, 198 Ga. 239, 31 S.E. (2d) 409 (I<).44);
Hurley v. Hurley, (W. Va. 1945) 34 S.E. (2d) 465.
18
Neely v. Neely, 162 Ore. 610, 94 P. (2d) 300 (1939), noted, 28 GEo. L. J.
694 (1940).
19
Winnard v. Winnard, 62 Ohio App. 351, 23 N.E. (2d) 977 (1939), noted,
38 MICH. L. REV. 1328 (1940).
20
·
Separation as a ground for divorce was recognized in: Ala. Gen. Acts (1943)
No. 463, p. 425 (voluntary abandonment from bed and board for one year instead of
two years); Utah Laws (1943), c. 46, p. 60.
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patibility persisted in for a statutory period. 21 The basis of the request
for divorce here appears to be not fault or misfortune of one party
but the inability of the two, after a reasonable time, to develop and
maintain a stable family life. As the state is interested in stable families, an unhealthy condition, it is contended, should be remedied by
dissolution. Under the orthodox view of fault divorce this procedure
is to be viewed with alarm-inter alia, as an encouragement to collusion. The fundamental question is how far the law can expect effectively to cope with such personal matters as the lack of affection of a
man for his wife. Ecclesiastical excommunication, which weighed on
the medieval conscience, and civil outlawry are not modern legal sanctions. Perhaps more intelligent legal progress could be made if the
public, under the leadership of the interested professions, were to settle
the question whether divorce is to be treated as a cause or a sympto!ll
of a more profound cause. In any case an inquiry into the reason for,
as well as the fact of separation should be rewarding: North Carolina
and Maryland cases have discussed the problem under their respective
statutes. 22
2. The problem of divorce
The cases re-emphasize the questions-why are divorces granted;
and how should that objective best be accomplished? The English
system of allowing a limited judicial discretion has merit. 23 But the
21 Moran, "Divorce for Incompatability of Temperament," 9 DuKE B.A.J. 49
(1941). The writer then refers to such recent cases as: Wiggins v. Wiggins, 268 Ky.
352, 104 S.W. (2d) 1097 (1937) (false and malicious accusation of unchasity);
Henderson v. Henderson, 137 Fla. 770, 189 S. 24 (1939) (spouse cast aspersions on
complainant's relatives and showed lack of consideration during illness); Anderson v.
Anderson, 199 Wash. 696, 93 P. (2d) 290 (1939) (spouse practiced cold and studied
indifference, also using vulgar language); Putnam v. Putnam, 86 Mont. 135, 282 P.
8 5 5 ( l 929) (continuous nagging).. See also Silving, "Divorce without Fault," 29
lowA L. REv. 527 (i944).
22 Young v. Young, 225 N.C. 340, 34 S.E. (2d) 154 at, 157 (1945), defines the
word "separation" in the North Carolina statute as "living apart for the entire period
in such manner that those who come in contact with them may see that the husband
and wife are not living together." Beck v. Beck, 180 Md. 321, 24 A. (2d) 295
( I 942) ( divorce refused because "there is no evidence in the record that the parties
mutually agreed to live apart at any time ...," id. at 323); Nichols v. Nichols, 181
Md. 392, 30 A. (2d) 446 (1943), noted, 7 Mo. L. REv. 146 (1943) (divorce
refused). These two cases discuss the Maryland Statute of 1937 [Md. Laws (1937)
c. 396, p. 791] allowing divorce after five years voluntary separation.
23 Andrews v. Andrews, [1940] P. 184, noted, 4 Moo. L. REv. 307 (1941).
Here petitioner had engaged in adultery. Upon advice of counsel he broke it off
before filing the petition. Before the final decree was granted he resumed without
disclosing the fact to the court. The court granted the decree saying there is no universal rule requiring the breaking off or interruption of adulterous associations until
the decree is absolute. Whereby in time of long association and the birth of children
a new home has been set up there would be something unreal in such a demand,
especially where the parties were too poor to provide alternative accommodation.
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legislative limits upon that discretion require careful thought. If our
purpose is release from an intolerable situation and the establishment
of two homes instead of one, the limited divorce would appear a reasonable solution which might be freely employed. If our purpose is to
censure publicly one of the spouses, our present "grounds" go at least
part of the way. If our purpose is to permit the parties or one of them
to remarry rather than to encourage marital misconduct perhaps there
should be closer correlation between the divorce and the criminal law.
Perhaps there should be a probationary period for the "guilty" spouse.
But if we are here dealing with the dissolution of a status-the break
up- of a family-the dislocation of a unit in society which has certain
important functions to perform, perhaps we should distinguish between the grievances which individual members of a family have
against each other and the question of dissolution. A divorce may prevent continuance of an intolerable situation but so often it is a matter
of "out of the frying pan into the fire."

3. Remarriage after divorce
The period of "cooling off" after a decree nisi, and before an
absolute divorce decree is entered, has appealed to a number of legislatures as a final opportunity to encourage reconciliation. 24 How useful
this is in fact may be questioned. Complete statistics are not available.
One wonders, however, whether the situation may not be compared to
the period in the field of medical care known as convalescence. The
patient usually is not left to his own devices. Adequate nursing and post
operative care have come to be regarded as necessary. In the legal field,
similarly, it may come to be recognized as desirable for the court to
supply some sort of supervision over divorced persons, perhaps by
probation officers, to see that they adjust to their new status with a
minimum of complications.
·
In a recent Massachusetts case 25 the willingness of the courts to aid
the parties is illustrated. H married W1 in 1927. Before his pending
Massachusetts divorce became valid, he married W2 in Rhode Island.
, 24 Ala. Gen. Acts (1943) No. 566, p. 569 (judge may allow or disallow the party
against whom decree rendered to remarry: if disallowed the judge may later entertain
a petition for permission to remarry); Idaho Laws (1943) c. 25, p. 53, amending
Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 31-207, (abolishes six-month waiting period); Mass. Acts
and Resolves (1943) c. 168, p. 182 (the party against whom a decree of divorce is
rendered may not remarry unless the other party is dead); Va. Laws (1944) c. 142,
p. 181, amending Va. Code (Michie, 1942) § 5.n3, (reduces the waiting period from
six to four months). The right to marry after an Oregon divorce is considered in
23 ORE. L. REv. 132 (1944). The effect of divorce and remarriage upon separation
agreements is discussed in 5 UNiv. NEWARK L. REv. 419 (1940).
25 Vital v. Vital, (Mass. 1946) 65 N.E. (2d) 205, 17 BosT. BAR BuL. 124
(1946).
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The lower court found the second marriage void because H intended
to reside in Massachusetts. On appeal, however, the court found the
marriage good for one reason-that Hand W2 continued to live together as husband and wife beyond the two year waiting period.

B. Marriage
I. Ceremonial marriage. Recent legislation with respect to marriage has been in the direction of further regimentation: a license,26 a
waiting period,21 a medical examination.28
26

1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws, § 17 (1931). Ala. Gen. Acts (1943)
No. 337, p. 318 (provided manner of making corrections on the face of a marriage
license); Idaho Laws (1943), c. 50, p. 97 (authorized the issuance of a license to
persons under fifteen years of age under certain safeguards); Mass. Acts &· Resolves
(1943) c. 408,' p. 490 (authorized the granting of marriage licenses in military
reservations); Neb. Laws (1945) c. 99, p. 327 (provided for issuance of marriage
license to minors if parents are living separately and apart); Nev. Stat. (1943) c.
188, p. 275 (approved marriage of Indians by tribal custom if certificate of declaration
was filed within thirty days following the marriage) .
27
1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAw, § 16 (1931). Ark. Acts (1945), No.
I 12, p. 258 (requires three days notice of intention; but judge may approve a waiver
of the requirement); Cal. Stat. and Amend. to the Codes (1943) c. 349, p. 1345
(provisions requiring notice of at least three days and not more than thirty days are
suspended for the benefit of members of the armed forces during the national emergency); Idaho Laws (1943) c. 50, p. 97 (approves the marriage of a minor female
under fifteen by court order with certain safeguards) ; Md. Laws ( I 941) c. 529, p.
906 (permits a judge to dispense with the requirement that forty-eight hours elapse
between application for license and issuance); N.Y. Laws (1942) c. 731, p. 1616,
§ 13-c (suspends the twenty-four hour war-time period in favor of members of the
armed forces); N.C. Laws (1945) c. 1046, p. 1373 (requires forty-eight hour waiting period between the filing of an application and the issuance of a marriage license
where both parties are non-residents of the state: the act applies only to certain eastern
counties); Wis. Laws (1941) c. 162, p. 212 (establishes a five-day waiting period
but allows court to waive it in special cases).
28
I VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws, § 43 (1931). Legislatures continued
to be impressed with value of medical examinations as prerequisite to marriage: Cal.
Stats. and Amend. to the Codes (1943) c. 214, p. 1II3 (a medical certificate from
another state or from the United States armed forces is acceptable if completed within
thirty days prior to issuance of marriage license and signed by a physician or United
States medical officer); Idaho Laws (1943) c. 42, p. 83 (requires certificate from a
licensed physician that applicant has been examined, including standard serological
tests and is not infected, or if so infected, the disease is not in a stage that is or may
become communicable); Mass. Acts and Resolves (1941) c. 601, p. 808, § I (requires
medical certificates of physical examinations including standard serological tests with
marriage license applications); Neb. Laws (1943) c. 103, p. 344 (requires a medical
examination before issuance of marriage license); N.C. Pub. Laws (1939) c. 314,
p. 702 (medical certificate must be executed within thirty days), id., as amended by
N.C. Pub. Laws (1943) c. 641, p. 755 (a person adjudged of unsound mind applying
for a marriage license must be sterilized unless subsequently adjudged of sound mind);
Ohio Laws (1941) Sen. Bill No. 141, p. 297 (requires a medical certificate within
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The marriage license, as a means of recording a change of status,
is an accepted device. Whether a prescribed waiting period and a medical examination accomplish what their proponent~ hoped, poses a more
difficult question. The law deals more readily with property than with
individual human emotions. It may be that a more effective solution
would be widespread education for marriage. It may be that a statute
making tampering with the dignity of the marriage relation a criminal
offense would provide the necessary means of shunting non-conforming
persons into the hands of the criminal law and thus allow the courts a
greater variety of legal tools. Again it might be desirable to make the
marriage license clerk. a more important official with greater discretion
and wider powers to keep undesirable applicants out of the circle of
married people.
But one wonders whether sufficient· thought has been given to
those groups of persons -who, with each step in the regimentation
process, find it more difficult tq attain the haven of matrimony. Does
regimentation of the process of getting married encourage more illicit
relationships than it cures? What is to be done with a person who is
refused a marriage license? Will further regimentation be required to
control him?
And yet on the other side of the question, should we sit idly by
while divorce statistics show an increase?
Surely the law needs to work in conjunction with other professions
here as elsewhere if we are to hope for improvement in our efforts to
answer such questions.
2. Common law marriage.: Common law marriage lost ground. 29
In Pennsylvania, long a supporter of the values of the common law
marriage, a 1939 statute prescribed a physical examination as a prerequisite to a legal union. A court construing this statute held that its
provisions applied to common law marriages as well as to ceremonial
unions.30
A Texas court 81 added the element of a ceremony to the requirements of a valid putative marriage. The woman could not be regarded
thirty days of the application for marriage license); Ore. Laws (1943) c. 218, p.
268 ( certificates from the United States armed forces commissioned medical officers
are acceptable); Va. Acts (1940) c. 102, p. 152, § 5073a (requires serological test
as prerequisite to marriage license) •
29 I VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS, § 26 (1931); Pacific, "Common Law
Marriage in Mississippi," 16 Miss. L.J. 40 (1943); 18 IND. L.J. 320 {1943); 19
TENN. L. REv. 83 (1945). Minn. Stat. (1941) § 517.01.
8 ° Fisher v. Sweet & McClain, 154 Pa. Super. 216, 35 A. (2d) 756 (1944);
Pendel, "Common Law Marriages in Pennsylvania/' 49 D1cK. L. REv. 94 (1945);
Tainter, "No More Common Law Marriage in Pennsylvania," 15 PA. B.A.Q. 281
(1944).
31 In re Greathouse's Estate, (Texas CiY. App. 1944) 184 S.W. (2d) 317; 24
TEXAS L. REv. 92 (1945).
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as a common law wife because H had a former wife living ~nd undivorced. She could not be a. putative wife because there had been no
ceremony of marriage. A similar result was reached in a Georgia case,32
by a federal court in Pennsylvania 33 and by an Indiana court.34
Several cases presented interstate problems: A New Yark court 35
held that no common law marriage was created when Hand W, New
York residents, lived together from 1935 to 1940 even though they
made frequent trips to jurisdictions in which common law marriage
was recognized as valid and, while there, satisfied the local requirements for the creation of such marriages.
.
A federal court sitting in New Jersey allowed W to claim Workmen's Compensation for a death occurring in Louisiana on the basis of
a relationship begun in New Jersey in 1937. Louisiana did not recognize common law marriages: New Jersey did, provided, says the court,
there is "an agreement entered into between 'the man and the woman,"
in words of the present tense, to live together as husband and wife. 36
Illinois was called upon to consider a Nevada common law marriage by Illinois citizens. The court 37 declined recognition of the status
because it found that the parties lacked the necessary intent to acquire
a domicil in Nevada.
The creation of a common law marriage after the removal of an
impediment was also discussed. The District of Columbia 38 dealt with
the question of legitimacy of a child. The child's parents cohabited
while H had another wife living. The child was born during this
period of cohabitation. W divorced Hand H subsequently acknowledged the child as his. The court found an intent to create a common
law marriage. Upon the removal of the impediment continued cohabit~tion of the parties was enough to constitute a valid common law
marriage.
32

Roberts v. Wilkerson, 70 Ga. App. 245, 28 S.E. (2d) 174 (1943).
ln re Walsh, (D.C. Pa. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 769.
34
Schilling v. Parsons, II0 Ind. App. 52, 36 N.E. (2d) 958 (1941), noted,
II FoRDHAM L. REv. 90 (1942). See also Jones v. Kemp, (C.C.A. 10th, 1944)
144 F. (2d) 478.
35
Shea v. Shea, 268 App. Div. 677, 52 N.Y.S. (2d) ·756 (1945), reversed, 294
N.Y. 909, 63 N.E. (2d) 113 (1945).
86
Franzen v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., (D.C. N.J. 1943) 51 F. Supp.
578. See also Pacific, "Common Law Marriages in Mississippi," 16 Miss. L.J. 40
(1943); 18 IND. L.J. 320 (1943); 19 TENN. L. REv. 83 (1945). New Jersey
abolished common law marriage in 1939. N.J. Laws (1939) c. 227, p. 624, amending
§ 37:1-10 of Rev. Stats.
37
Peirce v. Peirce, 310 Ill. App. 481, 34 N.E. (2d) 564 (1941); 30 ILL. B.J.
165 (1941).
38
Thomas v. Murphy, (App. D.C. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 268, 67 Wash. L. Rep.
1026, noted, 28 GEo. L.J. 845 (1940).
33
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Similarly, a Wisconsin court 39 dealt with H2 who married in good
faith and in full belief that the former marriage of W had been dissolved by a divorce. After removal of the impediment the parties continued to live together and the court held they must be considered to
be legally married from and after the time of the removal of the impediment.
In another federal case 40 the Minnesota law, prior to the act of
r94r, was examined. The court was satisfied that a common law marriage, entered into prior to that time, was valid. "If persons were
competent to enter into a marriage contract and agreed between themselves in the present tense to become husband and wife, the marriage
was complete. Cohabitation added nothing to the marriage contract,
except that it might constitute evidence of the contract." 4 1.
An examination of the cases in which common law marriages have
been allowed suggests that there is often merit in the concept. It is possible that the pendulum which now seems to be swinging in favor of
ceremonial marriages may ultimately, by necessity, come nearer to
something like the putative marriage of the civil law.
3. Abolished remedies. The legislative drive against suit for alienation of affections and similar matters continued.42 The courts in jurisdictions which had previously outlawed such suits were required to determine various questions. In one case 43 a resident of Pennsylvania sued
a resident of Illinois for criminal conversation and alienation of affections. The defense was an Illinois statute providing a criminal penalty
for persons filing such a suit. The court held that the act was contrary
to the Illinois constitution-which provides "every person ought to
find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he
may receive in his person, property, or reputation." 44
The statute apparently attempts to prohibit or intimidate parties
from invoking the aid of the federal courts.
A New Yark court 45 under a different type of statute, providing
that actions for "breach of promise to marry" are against public policy,
39
Hoffman v. Hoffman, 242 Wis. 83, 7 N.W. (2d) 428 (1943), noted, 28
MARQ. L.Q. 50 (1944).
40
United States v. Michaelson, (D.C. Minn. 1945) 58 F. Supp. 796.
4
1. Id. at 798.
42
For example, see Nev. Stat. (1943) c. 53, p. 75 which seems to have abolished
these actions.
43
Daily v. Parker, (D.C. Ill. 1945) 61 F. Supp. 701, noted, 14 UNIV. KAN.
C1TY L. REv. 59 (1945-1946). In Root v. Root, (D.C. Cal. 1940) 31 F. Supp.
562, the action was for alienation of affections. While it was pending, California
adopted a series of laws abolishing such causes of action. The court refused to dismiss
the suit because W's right to sue for alienation of H's affections is not purely statutory
and because the statute impliedly recognized the continuance of causes of action previously arising. Noted in 13 So. CAL. L. REv. 523 (1940).
44 III. Const. ( l 870) Art. 2, § 19.
45
Phillips v. Oltarsh, (App. Div. 1946) 59 N.Y.S. (2d) 366.
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dealt with a peculiar problem. H1 and W1 were married. H2 and W2
were married. H 1 and W 2 went to Reno with the understanding that
each was to secure a divorce. W2 got her divorce but H1 did not. On
the way home H1 offered W2 $75 a week while she remained ready_
to marry him. She rejected one other suitor. H1 paid only the first
two installments: W 2 sued for breach of the agreement. The court
found her suit in violation of the act.
In another New York case 46 plaintiff sued to recover real prqperty
which he alleged he had given defendant in reliance upon defendant's
fraudulent representations and promise of marriage. The court dismissed the complaint since it was in reality one based upon an alleged
breach of promise to marry and so outlawed by the New York statute.
A federal court 47 gave similar construction to a Pennsylvania statute in a suit for $10,000 damages for gifts and expenditures in contemplation of marriage. Here plaintiff alleged that defendant "wilfully and knowingly made false and fraudulent promises of marriage."
Instead of the present choice in breach of promise actions between
a dramatic court room demonstration and no right of action at all, some
compromise may be discovered which will, perhaps, provide pretrial
probationary investigation of some similar process, as a means of protecting both parties from undesired publicity until "probable cause" or
actual damages can be proven. Granting the excesses in these causes of
action, a lawyer with his traditional conservatism tends to feel that
there must have been a real justification or the right would never have
been recognized.
C. Domicil
1. In general. The problem of domicil as between married persons
developed further complexities during the period 1940-1945, especially with respect to the separate domicil of married women and the
domicil ( or residence) prerequisite for a divorce .
With respect to the wife's authority to acquire a separate domicil:
The English rule generally holds the wife to her husband's domicil.
The orthodox American rule 48 allows the wife, for purposes of divorce,
to acquire a separate domicil. More recently the courts have permitted the wife, who is still on friendly terms with her husband, a separate
domicil for tax purposes. 49
46

Morris v. Baird, (App. Div. 1945) 54 N.Y.S. (2d) 779, noted, 14 FORDHAM
223 (1945).
47
A.B. v. C.D.~ (D.C. Pa. 1940) 36 F. Supp. 85, noted, 41 CoL. L. REV. 918
(1941); see also 25 MARQ. L. REv. 167 (1941).
48
Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87 (1856); Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. (76 U.S.)
1089 (1869).
49
Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 160 Va. 524, 169 S.E. 909 (1933), noted, 47
HARV. L. REv. 348 (1933). But see Payne v. Comm., (C.C.A. 5th, 1944) 141 F.
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But in ?, Tennessee case the court5° allowed the wife a separate
domicil wit~ respect to the descent of property. The wife living amicably with her husband in Nebraska removed to Tennessee without fault
by the husband and with a fixed intention of making Tennessee her
permanent address. She lived twenty-one years in the latter state with
her husband's acquiescence. The distribution of her personal property
was allowed to follow Tennessee law.
This ruling seems a logical development in the process by which
the legal identity of the wife is emerging from its common law eclipse.
2. Servicemen's domicil. War conditions naturally raised questions as to the domicil of servicemen for purposes of divorce. The Sol.diers and Sailor's Civil Relief Act 51 protected the rights of servicemen
as· defendants. When they were plaintiffs, a different problem was
presented. In general, physical presence and intent are necessary to
constitute domicil. 52
The domicil of persons in the Armed Forces has been the subject
of decision in a number of cases.58 Recently a court held 54 that a soldier
stationed in Virginia who married in South Carolina could acquire an
(2d) 398, where the court declined to allow the wife a separate domicil for tax purposes. Quoting, at p. 399, from Cheever v. Wilson: "The rule is that she may
acquire a ,separate domicil whenever it is necessary or proper that she should do so.
The right springs from the necessity for its exercise, and endures as long as the
necessity continues." The court then comments, "We perceive no necessity or propriety in raising a separate domicile here."
50 Younger v. Gianotti, 176 Tenn. 139, 138 S.W. (2d) 448 (1940), noted, 16
TENN. L. REV. 746 (1941).
.
51 Pub. Law No. 861, 76th Cong., 3d sess. (Oct. 17, 1940) as amended; Pub.
Law No. 732, 77th Cong., 2d sess., c. 581. Pub. Law No. 861, § 200, provided
for a stay of proceedings where a· person in military service is plaintiff or defendant,
subject to the discretion of the court. The American Bar Association Committee on
War Work compiled A MANUAL OF LAW FOR UsE BY ADVISORY BoARDS FOR REGISTRANTS, 2d ed. (1942) containing material available up to September, 1942.
52 ln Taylor v. Taylor, (W.Va. 1945) 3'6 S.E. (2d) 601 at 605, the West
Virginia court said: "It is to be noted thaf, under the statute, no definite period of time
is required to establish a legal residence. Likewise, in the absence of any statutory regulation, no definite period of residence or specified length of time in a particular place
is necessary to establish a domicil; but, when accompanied with the element of intent,
any residence, however short, will be sufficient to. establish a domicile, even if it is
but for a day."
In Messick v. Southern Pennsylvania Bus_ Co., (D.C. Pa. 1945) 59 F. Supp. 799,
the court said at 800: "Domicile denotes a place of resid~nce accompanied by an intention to remain there for an unlimited time [ citing authorities] ..•. A man may
have several residences and can change his residence at will; but domicile, once estab- .
lished, so remains until a new domicile is gained."
53 See Rodman, "Basis of Divorce Jurisdiction," 39 ILL. L. REv. 343 (1945).
See note in 28 MINN. L. REv. 69 (1943); 21 NEB. L. REv. 326 (1942).
54,Hawkins v. Winstead, (Idaho 1943) 138 P. (2d) 972, noted, 28 MINN. L.
REv. 69 (1943).
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Idaho domicil for the purpose of procuring a divorce. Here the soldier
received permission to live outside the barracks and rented a room.
With what the court found was bona fide intent, he registered as a voter
and remained for the statutory period.
.
In another case 55 the court found that a serviceman, a resident of
Virginia who was stationed in Louisiana and married there, had a
matrimonial domicil in Louisiana. The parties rented a room in a
rooming house which they occupied for about a week. The court accepted the testimony of the plaintiff-husband that he intended to establish a matrimonial domicil in Louisiana, in spite of the fact that he was
subject to military service and might be transferred at any time. It
seems that practical considerations may have been given considerable
weight.
In a third case the problem was not of acquiring a domicil, but
whether one had been lost. An Illinois court 56 found that a naval officer still was a "bona fide resident" of Illinois for the purpose of a divorce even though for a period of over twenty years he had made but
a few brief visits to his original home. His testimony as to intent plus
a provision of the Illinois constitution, to the effect that no person in
the military or naval service of the United States shall lose his residence by reason of absence from the state because of such service~ were
factors.
Lack of adequate statistics as to divorce makes it impossible even
to approximate the number of cases in which divorces were refused
servicemen in the state trial courts because they were stationed on a
military post. Nor can one estimate the number granted where, as in
the Idaho case, residence off the post plus a statement of intention were
held sufficient. It may have been that trial courts adopted some general policy on such matters in view of the disturbed condition of the
times.
Examples of the statutes dealing with the subject are noted. 57
55
Burgan v. Burgan, 207 La. 1057, 22 S. (2d) 649 (1945), noted, 20 TULANE
L. REv. 268 (1945); 6 LA. L. REv. 469 (1945).
56
Johnson v. Johnson, 313 Ill. App. 193, 39 N.E. (2d) 389 (1942), noted, 31
ILL. B.J. 249 (1943).
57
Del. Laws (1945) c. 225, p. 906 (attempts to bring its law into conformity
with this decision in the first Wi11iams case by eliminating certain jurisdictional requirements); Amendment proposed to Constitution of Ga. by legislative resolution,
Ga. Laws (1943) No. 63, p. 68 (makes special permission for residents of military
reservations to prosecute divorce in an adjacent county); Mo. Laws (1943) S.B. 153,
p. 398 (one year's residence pre-requisite to suit for divorce); Mich. Pub. ~nd Local
Acts (1941) No. 2, p. 4 (plaintiff must have resided continuously for one year);
Pa. Laws (1943) No. 25, p. 46 (spouse in the armed forces in time of war may make
an affidavit in a divorce libel before commissioned officer in the armed forces authorized
to take affidavits).
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3. The Williams cases. So much has been written 58 about the two
Williams cases that there is no occasion here to do more than refer to
some of the conclusions about them. An able and recent analysis of the
58
A succession of decisions led up to the Williams case: Cheever v. Wilson, 9
Wall. (76 U.S.) 108 (1869), held substantially that a divorce decree granted at the
domicil of one spouse is entitled to full faith and credit in another state if personal
service in the first state has been made upon the other within that state.
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 8 S.Ct. 723 (1888), held that an Oregon
divorce granted to the husband who was domiciled there was valid in Oregon as against
the wife who was domiciled in the east.
Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 21 S.Ct. 544 (1901), held that a divorce
granted to the husband at the matrimonial domicil was entitled to full faith and credit
in the state of the wife's separate domicil even though she had not been personally
served and had not appeared. Up to this time the courts had tended to regard
divorce as a proceeding in rem and paid much attention to the marriage status.
Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175, 21 S.Ct._551 (1901); Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181
U.S. 179, 21 S.Ct. 553 (1901), where neither spouse was domiciled in the state
granting the decree and the defendant was reached only by constructive service even
though the procedure amounted to due process, the decree was not entitled to full
,faith.
Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 23 S.Ct. 237 (1903), where neither party
was domiciled in the state granting the divorce even though defendant personally appeared and consented to the jurisdiction the decree was not entitled to full faith and
credit.
These cases indicate that application of the "full faith and credit" clause does
not prevent the court of the instant forum from inquiring into the jurisdiction of the
court granting the decree.
In Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 26 S.Ct. 525 (1906), the court held
that the domicil of the wife and domicil of matrimony from which the husband fled
in disregard of his duty had remained in New York. New York was warranted in
refusing recognition to a Connecticut divorce decree even though the husband was
domiciled in Connecticut and the divorce was valid there. The question of fault as
between the spouses became more significant. Certain states, among them North Carolina, were enabled to give effect to their policy of protecting their own domiciled
spouses as against foreign divorce decrees.
During the years since the Haddock case, various applications of the rule were
made. For example: Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 59 S.Ct. 3 (1938).
Where the plaintiff is probably domiciled in the state which granted the decree;
and where this probability turns out to be justified; where the defendant appears and
litigates the issue the decree is entitled to full faith and credit. Again it is noted that
where the issue in the present forum is the enforcement of one of the incidents of the
domestic relation such as a request for support, the urge to require application of the
"full faith and credit" clause appears stronger than in cases of capacity to remarry.
Notes and articles on the first Williams case (not intended to be exhaustive):
Lorenzen, "Haddock v. Haddock Overruled," 52 YALE L.J. 341 (1943); Holt,
"The Bones of Haddock and Haddock," 41 M1cH. L. REv. 1013 (1943); Radin,
"The Extraterritorial Decree of Divorce," 18 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 29 (1943); Moore
and Oglebay, "The Supreme Court, Full Faith and Credit," 29 VA. L. REV. 557
(1943); Bingham, "Song of Sixpence," 29 CoRN. L.Q. l (1943); Edmunds, "Williams v. North Carolina-Whither Now?" 8 JoHN MARSHALL L.Q. 261 (1943);
)acobs, "Connecticut versus Nevada," 17 CoNN. RJ. 95 (1943); Tuck, "Let No
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decisions is made by Professor Herbert H. Baer. 59 He sums up the
effect of the majority opinion in the first case in the following words:
"Summing up the majority opinion amounts to this:
"r. Domicile of one of the parties is the necessary jurisdictional element and the wrong or fault of the person establishing
such domicile is immaterial to jurisdiction.
2. Nevada having found that Williams and Mrs. Hendrix
were domiciled in Nevada may grant a divorce decree which in the
absence of a contrary finding on domicile by North Carolina must
be given full faith and credit in that state.
3. Whether North Carolina may refuse to give full faith and
credit to the Nevada decree if it, contrary to Nevada, finds the
parties were not domiciled in Nevada is not now passed on by the
court. That will be decided later-meanwhile the case is remanded to the North Carolina Supreme Court which presumably will
direct an inquiry be made at a new trial on the existence or nonexistence of the Nevada domicile."
·

In the interval between the two Williams decisions the appellate
courts in various states sought to adjust their rulings to a field of law
from which the Haddock case had been eliminated. For example, in
Illinois the court, in r943, held that a Nevada divorce decree that is
Court Put Asunder," 22 CAN. B. REv. 681 (1944); Strahorn and Reiblich, "The
Haddock Case Overruled-The Future of Interstate Divorce," 7 MD. L. REv. 29
(1942); Burns, "Two Nevada Divorces Get Full Faith and Credit," 29 A.B.A.J.
125 (1943); 43 CoL. L. REv. 116 (1943); 8 NEv. S.B.J. I (1943); 21 CAN. B. REV.
135 (1943); Nicholson, ''Williams v. North Carolina," 14 BosT. BAR BuL. 7 (1943);
31 GEo. L.J. 210 (1943); 17 TEMPLE L.Q. 197 (1943); II GEo. WAsH. L. REv.
379 (1943); 20 N.C. L. REv.-294 (1942); 91 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 565 (1943);
Hirsch, "In Memoriam: Haddock v. Haddock," 14 PA. B.A.Q. 232 (1943); Conrad
and Aberg, "The Supreme Court and Full Faith and Credit," 29 VA. L. REv. 557
(1943); Smith, ''Williams v. North Carolina and Our Divorce Law," 15 BosT. BAR
BuL. 23 (1944); 22 NEB. L. REv. 141 (1943); 18 TENN. L. REv. 288 (1944);
Smith, "Williams v. North Carolina Rides Again," 15 BosT. BAR BuL. 167 (1944);
Stephenson, "Conflict of Laws-The Migratory Divorce-Williams v. State of North
Carolina," 33 KY. L.J. 123 (1945); 41 MICH. L. REv. 754 (1943); 21 TEXAS L.
REV. 622 (1943); .22 ORE. L. REv. 362 (1943).
Notes and articles on the second Williams case: Powell, "And Repent at Leisure,"
58 HARV. L. REv. 930 (1945); Corwin, "Out-Haddocking Haddock," 93 UNIV.
PA. L. REv. 341 (1945); 20 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 436 (1945); Lorenzen, "ExtraTerritorial Divorce," 54 YALE L.J. 799 (1945); Rodman, "Bases of Divorce Juri~
diction," 39 ILL. L. REv. 343 (1945); 33 GEo. L.J. 488 (1945); 19 TEMPLE L.Q.
120 (1945); 45 CoL. L. REv. 796 (1945); 15 UTAH BAR BUL. 19 (1945); 6 LA.
L. REv. 290 (1945); 18 RocKY MT. L. REv. 60 (1945); IO NEv. S.B.J. 121
(1945); 3 NAT. B.J. 304 (1945); 33 KY. L.J. 123 (1945); 20 N.D.L.J. 436
(1945); 3 LoYoLA L. REv. 73 (1945).
69
Baer, "So Your Client Wants a Divorce," 24 N.C. L. REV. I at II (1945).
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valid in Nevada is entitled to full faith and credit in. Illinois.00 In
I 944 the same court held in a 'similar case that the use of the word
"residence" in the Nevada law does not lessen the requirement that
there be an established domicil in Nevada if the decree is to receive
full faith and credit in Illinois. Illinois may determine for itself
whether there was a bona fide domicil in Nevada.61 Colorado also held
that a decree of divorce is not entitled to full faith and credit where
it is granted on constructive service by a court of a state in which neither
spouse is domiciled even though the spouse against whom the divorce
was obtained was personally served at her residence. 62
New York held that a divorce decree granted by another state is
open to collateral attack on ground that the court which granted the
divorce lacked jurisdiction. At least one of the parties must be domiciled in the granting state.63
Massachusetts also refused recognition of an Idaho divorce where
neither party was found to be domiciled in Idaho. 64 Pennsylvania made
a similar ruling sustained by the United State Supreme Court.65 And
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the first
Williams case did not apply. 66
The second Williams case,67 in a sense, was given direction from a
sentence in the opinion of the Court in the first case:
. "Nor do we reach here the question as to the power of North
Carolina to refuse full faith and credit to Nevada divorce decrees
60

Stephens v. Stephens, 319 Ill. App. 29~, 49 N.E. (2d) 560 (1943), noted,
32 ILL. B.J. 275 (1944); 22 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 77 (1943).
61
Atkins v. Atkins, 386 Ill. 345, 54 N.E. (2d) 488 (1944), noted, 33 ILL.
B.J. 164 (1945); 39 ILL. L. REV. 191 (1944); 23 CH1.-KENT L. REV. 90 (1944).
62
Koscove v. Koscove, (Colo. 1945) 156 P. (2d) 696 (1945).
63
McCarthy v. McCarthy, 29 N.Y. L.J., Feb. 4 ,1943, p. 477, col. 3, noted, 43
CoL. L. REv. 257 (1943); Forster v. Forster, 182 Misc. 382, 46 N.Y.S. (2d) 320
(1944), noted, 30 VA. L. REv. 491 (1944); Matter of Lindgren, 293 N.Y. 18, 55
N.E. (2d) 849 (1944), noted, i9 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 58 (1944).
64
Bowditch v. Bowditch, 314 Mass. 410, 50 N.E. (2d) 65 (1943), noted, 24
BosT. UNiv. L. REv. 50 (1944).
65
Commonwealth ex rel. Esenwein v. Esenwein, 153 Pa. Super. 69, 33 4. (2d)
675 (1943), affd., 325 U.S. 279, 65 S.Ct. lII8 (1945), wherein Justice Frankfurter for the Court said in part, at p. 28 l: "The Full Faith and Credit Clause
[ Const. Art. 4, Sec. 1] placed the Pennsylvania courts under d"Q.ty to accord prima
facie validity to the Nevada decree. The burden is on the litigant who would escape
the operation of a judgment decreed in another State. Pennsylvania recognized that
burden, but its courts were warranted in finding that the respondent susta'ined her
. burden of impeaching the foundation of the Nevada decree on the jurisdictional prerequisite of bona fide domi1:il." See 17 TEMPLE L.Q. 466 (1943); 92 UNiv. PA. L.
REv. 421 (1944); 48 D1cK. L. REv. 112 (1944).
66
Bassett v. Bassett, (C.C.A. 9th, 1944) 141 F. (2d) 954. See also Noffsinger
v. Noffsinger, (D.C. D.C. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 810; Marchman v. Marchman, 198 Ga.
739, 32 S.E. (2d) 790 (1945).
67
·
325 U.S. 226, 65 S.Ct. 1092 (1945).
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because, contrary to the finding of the Nevada court, North Carolina finds th3:t no bona fide domicil was acquired in Nevada." 68
Professor Baer sums up the majority bpinion in this second case as
follows: 69
"Sutnming up the majority opinion in the second Williams
case it appears that:
r. As in the first Williams case, domicile of one of the parties
is the necessary jurisdictional element and the wrong or fault of
the person establishing such domicile is immaterial to jurisdiction.
2. The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prevent an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court whose judgment is relied
on in another state even though the record purports to show jurisdiction.
3. Although Nevada found that Williams and Mrs. Hendrix
were domiciled in Nevada and in the light thereof could grant
a decree of divorce "unassailable" in that state such finding of
domicile was not conclusive on North Carolina.
4. North Carolina, in the protection of its social institutions,
may independently examine .into the question of the Nevada
court's jurisdiction, that is, it may for itself determine if the parties obtaining the divorce decrees were domiciled in Nevada. In
doing so, however, it may not disregard the Nevada decrees but
must accord them 'respect.'
5. The duty of 'respe~' is satisfied where the fact finding
body in North Carolina is instructed that the Nevada decrees are
'prima f acie' evidence of domicile in that state and where the finding of lack of domicile by the North Carolina jury is 'amply supP,Orted by evidence' and the result of 'fair determination.'"
Professor Baer suggests some of the serious questions which remain: 10

"r. Does the rule of the first Williams case apply when the
spouse left at home seeks support?
2. Does the rule of the second Williams case permitting the
state of matrimonial domicile to question the jurisdictional fact
apply to the other forty.:.six states as well?
3. Could the spouse left at home rely on the Nevada divorce
if he did not contest it and remarry on the faith of it, or would
he then too be guilty of bigamy?
68

317 U.S. 287 at 302, 63 S.Ct. 207 (1942).
Baer, "So Your Client Wants a Divorce,'' 24 N.C. L. REv. I at 25 (1945).
10
Id. at 30.
69
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4. ,Are property rights to be determined by the Nevada decree
or by a local jury reinq'uiring into the fact of domicile?
5. If there had been a contest between the spouses in Nevada
on the question of jurisdiction, would that bar either the state of
matrimonial domicile or any other state from relitigating the
jurisdictional fact? Would it bar some other person claiming
property interests?"
By way of comparison the action of Argentina m recogmzmg a
Uruguay divorce may be mentioned.71

D. Attacks upon Foreign Dmorce Decrees
A variety of devices is available for attacking a foreign divorce
decree. In addition to, the orthodox methods of estoppel, a declaratory judgment and and injunction have been tried.
A New York court 12 was faced with the following problem: The
parties were domiciled in Connecticut. The wife went to Nevada for
a divorce which she obtained by default. The husband in Connecticut
secured a declaratory judgment that the wife's residence in Nevada
was merely for the purpose of the divorce. The wife returned with her
divorce to New York. The husband sued her for malicious prosecution. The court dismissed the suit. The case is interesting as an illustration of the ineffectiveness of the law in preventing a spouse from
procuring a foreign divorce even on colorable grounds.
In respect to injunctive relief it appears 73 that there are three
major grounds for granting an injunction to restrain a foreign divorce
proceedings: an evasion of the laws of the domicil or of a strong public policy; undue hardship; fraud.
71 Divorce in Matrimonial Domicil Held Entitled to Recognition in Argentina
Where Divorce is Not Granted. In Matter of U.I.T., (2d Civil Chamber of the
Capitol 1940) 21 La Ley 440, H married in Delaware, which grants divorce, obtained
a divorce in Uruguay, the matrimonial domicil. H then became a resident of Argentina
and was refused a permit to marry on the ground that the divorce was invalid. Argentina law provides that no marriage even though contracted in a country granting
divorce can be dissolved except by death. A treaty between Argentina, Uruguay, and
others provides that the law of the matrimonial domicil shall govern the dissolubility
of a marriage provided the ground for dissolution is admitted by the place where the
marriage was contracted. Although the treaty applies only where the marriage was
contracted ,in a signatory state the divorce should be recognized since Uruguay was
the bona fide matrimonial domicil. 55 HARV. L. REv. l 377 ( 1942).
·
72
Weidlich v. Weidlich, 177 Misc. 246, 30 N.Y.S. (2d) 326 (1941). See also
on Declaratory Judgment, Mills v. Mills, 119 Conn. 612, 179A.5 (1935), noted, 16
BosT. UNiv. L. REv. 915 (1936).
73 Jacobs, "The Utility of Injunctions and Declaratory Judgments in Migratory
Divorce," 2 LAw & CoNTEM. PRoB. 370 (1935).
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An Ohio court 74 issued an injunction against a Mexican divorce on
the ground that the defendant had not established a bona fide residence
in Mexico. Later, when the present plaintiff sought a divorce in Ohio
and the defendant pleaded the Mexican decree, the court refused to
recognize it because jurisdiction could not be conferred by the consent
of the parties.
On the other hand, a New York court7 5 declined to enjoin a husband from proceeding with a Florida divorce because the divorce, if
granted, would be void and therefore there would be no injury to the
plaintiff.
The orthodox methods of attacking foreign divorces have provided
a basis for employing equitable devices such as estoppel. The cases may
be classified depending upon whether the attack is made by a first
spouse, a second spouse, or some other person.
r. Attack by first spouse. Where a first spouse attacks a foreign
divorce decree, his ability to succeed may be affected by a variety of
factors. One of them may be whether the object of the proceeding is
support rather than some of the incidents of marriage. A Pennsylvania court in response to an application for relief from a support
order refused to recognize a Nevada divorce, thus apparently holding
that the element of support makes no difference. 76
Another possible factor is fraud on the court granting the foreign
divorce. This fraud is frequently failure of the foreign divorce plaintiff to acquire proper domicil in the foreign state. But such defects may
be rendered of no effect if the opposite spouse so conducts himself as
to waive his right to object or otherwise estops himself. The New York
courts have been particularly active in the development of such principles of estoppel. In one case W 11 secured a Nevada divorce. H
74
Bobala v. Bobala, 68 Ohio App. 63, 33 N.E. (2d) 845 (1940), noted, 16
UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 257 (1942).
75
Goldstein v. Goldstein, 283 N.Y. 146, 27 N.E. (2d) 969 (1940), noted, 40
CoL. L. REv. 1255 (1940); 8 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 141 (1940); 18 N.Y. UNiv.
L.Q. 94, (1940).
76
Commonwealth v. Esenwein, 153 'Pa. Super. 69, 33 A. (2d) 675 (1943),
referred to supra, note 63, noted, 48 DrcK. L. REv. 112 ( 1944).
77
Vernon v. Vernon, 262 App. Div. 431, 29 N.Y.S. (2d) 736 (1941), noted,
41 CoL. L. REv. 1436 (1941). In Frost v. Frost, 260 App. Div. 694, 23 N.Y.S. (2d)
754 (1940), the court also held that a general appearance by H in the Nevada proceeding precluded his later attacking a property settlement embodied in it. Noted, 54 ·
HARV. L. REv. 1060 (1941). In Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E. (2d) 290
(1940), H procured a foreign divorce and married W2. While the decree was void
for lack of jurisdiction, nevertheless it was held H was estopped to deny its validity.
See notes, 15 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 107 (1940); 27 VA. L. REv. 118 (1940); 20
BosT. UNiv. L. REv. 563 (1940); 9 FoRDHAM L. REv. 242 (1940); IO BROOKLYN
L. REv. 108 (1940). The majority of the court in this case did not expressly overrule the decision of Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N.Y. 157, 7 N.E. (2d) 26 (1937),
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appeared after judgment and secured a modification of the decree with
respect to alimony and custody of the child. The court held that although the original Nevada decree was invalid in New York, the modified deci;-ee was entitled to recognition.
But appearance in the foreign jurisdiction is not the only pitfall
for the spouse who appears as defendant in the origina-I divorce action.
He may marry again. A New York court dealing with this situation 78
held that the first Williams case did not apply and that the foreign
plaintiff was not properly domiciled for purposes of a divorce but the
subsequent marriage of the defendant spouse estopped him to succeed
in a claim for a share in the estate of the other.
Similar problems of recognition of foreign divorces aris-e in criminal
cases. A Pennsylvania court 79 dealt with such a case in which the defendant, indicted for adultery, pleaded an Illinois divorce. The court
recognized the validity of the divorce even though service w~s only
by publication. In a similar case a f~deral court in Massachusetts 8 ~
had to deal with a woman who, accused of "fornicatiqn," pleaded a
Mexican divorce. The court found the spouses domiciled in Massachusetts and refused to recognize the divorce.
The New York courts and tp.ose of other states which in the past
have shown a reluctance to recognize certain foreign divorces granted
under conditions contrary to the public policy of the forum are not
the only ones faced with problems of decision.
A federal court 81 held that estoppel did not prevent one of the
spouses from contesting the validity of a Mexican divorce decree procured with the consent and cooperation of both parties. Another court,
after the lapse of eleven years allowed a wife to assert fraud in the
execution of a separation agreement. 82 H, after execution of the agreement, procured a Mexican divorce in which neither H nor W appeared;
he then married W2 and later died. A California court 83 held the first
spouse not'estopped to attack a Mexican divorce even though both parwhere the judgment was directly on the marital status. In the Krause case the court
held the matter involves a right or interest arising out of the marriage. In Oldham v.
Oldham, 174 Misc. 22, 19 N.Y.S. (2d) 667 (1940), W with the aid of Hz secured
a foreign divoi;ce and then married him.
78
In re Bingham's Estate, 265 App. Div. 463, 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 756 (1943),
noted, 41 M1cH. L. REv. 1201 (1943).
'
79 Commonwealth v. Custer, 145 Pa. Super. 535, 21 A. (2d) 524 (1941), noted,
8 UN1v. Prrrs. L. REv. 122 (1942).
80
Petition of R--., (D.C. Mass. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 969.
81 In re Garman v. Garman, (App. D.C. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 272, noted, 13
So. CAL. L. REv. 520 (1940); 27 GEo. L.J. 807 (1939).
82
In re Estate of McNutt, 36 Cal. App. (2d) 542, 98 P. (2d) 253 (1940),
noted, 25 IowA L: REv. 818 (1940); 25 MINN. L. REv. III• (1940).
83 Kegley v. Kegley, (Cal. App. 1936) 60 P. (2d) 482, noted, 21 M1'.NN. L.
REV. 599 (1937).
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ties had submitted themselves to the jurisdiction in a confession of
judgment.
The underlying principle that a court of the forum is not required
to afford ·full faith and credit to a foreign divorce decree where one
party does not personally appear and is brought into the picture only
by constructive service is emphasized by a Virginia court.84
2. Attack by second spouse. Where the attack upon the foreign
divorce decree is made by the second spouse somewhat similar conditions prevail. The basic principles have been the subject of legal research. 85 A second husband was permitted by a California court to
attack a Nevada divorce decree. 86 A Georgia court at the request of a
second spouse refused to recognize a Mexican divorce. 87
:eut, on the other hand, principles of estoppel or other equitable
rules were invoked to prevent successful attacks upon certain other
divorces. A federal court prevented a second spouse who had promised
to pay for the divorce from urging its invalidity.88 Another federal
court would not permit a second spouse, who had participated in a plan
to secure the divorce by misdirecting the attorney as to the address of
the defendant spouse, to attack the decree.89 A New York court in
dealing with a Mexican "mail order" divorce, a second marriage, a
subsequent Nevada divorce, and a property settlement, in the order
named, held a second spouse estopped to attack the divorce. 90 He had
appeared without contest by a duly authorized attorney. Since the
Nevada divorce established the validity of the previous marriage, the
second spouse failed to secure his objective. In another New York case
the court spoke in terms of "clean hands" with respect to an attack by
the second spouse of a Nevada divorce and refused his request. 91
3. Attack by third parties. As to attacks by third parties, a child
was permitted to attack a Florida decree. 92 The Florida decree was
invalid for lack of jurisdiction. Neither spouse was domiciled there and
84

McFarland v. McFarland, 179 Va. 418, 19 S.E. (2d) 77 (1942).
Jacobs, "Attack on Decrees of Divorce by Second Spouses," 15 N.C. L. REv.
136 (1937).
86
Brill v. Brill, 38 Cal. App. (2d) 741, 102 P. (2d) 534 (1940), noted, 10
FORDHAM L. REv. 96 (1941).
87
Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 S.E. (2d) 818 (1944), noted,
7 GA. B.J. 360 (1945).
88
Goodloe v. Hawk, (App. D.C. 1940) II3 F. (2d) 753, noted, 29 GEo. L.J.
106 (1940).
89
Saul v. Saul, (App. D.C. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 64, noted, 48 W. VA. L.Q. 170
(1942).
9
° Frost v. Frost, 260 App. Div. 694, 23 N.Y.S. (2d) 753 (1940), noted, 54
HARV. L. REv. 1060 (1941).
91
Heller v. Heller, 172 Misc. 875, 15 N.Y.S. (2d) 469 (1939), noted, 88
UNiv. PA. L. REv. 630 (1940).
92
ln re Lindgren's Estate, 293 N.Y. 18, 55 N.E. (2d) 849 (1944), noted, 91
UNiv. PA. L. REV. 215 (1944).
85
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the judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit in New York.
The husband, and father, was estopped to deny the validity of the
. Florida decree because he invoked the aid of the Florida courts. But
the majority of the court held that the father's disability did not attach
to the child, nor was it an answer that W2 had by her marriage obtained marital property rights. The child here was not seeking to
reestablish the marriage relation of H and W, but to secure the estate.
By the decree W2 is denied a widow's share. The case is an illustration
of the reluctance of the New York courts to recognize a Florida divorce.
In another case 93 H secured a Nevada decree from W 1 and married W2. W1 then secured a New York divorce from Hon the ground
he had always been domiciled in New York and that no prior valid
divorce had been obtained. Upon the death of W2 both Hand a sister
of W2 applied for letters of administration. The court held that the
effect of the New York divorce decree bound H and W 1 and that it
might declare invalid the Nevada divorce decree; but that the effect
of the New York decree did not extend to a sister of W2 who was a
stranger to that suit. Since no evidence was introduced in the present
situation to the effect that H had not been a bona fide domiciliary of
Nevada, the Nevada decree in the present action is entitled to full faith
and credit. It should be noted that this case was decided after the first
Williams case.
It is too soon to risk much of a prediction as to how far the principles underlying. these cases are affected by the decisions in the two
Williams cases. As matters stand, it seems justifiable to refer to them
here.
E. Alimony
The legislatures were not as concerned with alimony as with other
problems in the domestic relations field. 9 But there was, nevertheless,
considerable activity among the text writers. 95
I. General nature. The general nature· of alimony-whether it is
a debt, an obligation arising out of a status or something sui generis
is a major question. Contributions to the thinking on the subject have
been made by the courts.
,l

93

In re Holmes Estate, 291 N.Y. 261, 52 N.E. (2d) 424 (1943).
Cal. Stats. (1943) c. 912, p. 2770 (a divorced spouse is not entitled to alimony
from the estate of the other party if he or she has sufficient funds); N.M. Laws (1943)
c. 46, p. 66 (court authorized to modify an alimony order); N.Y. Laws (1940) c.
226, §§ 2, 3, p. 821 amending N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1941) § 1169, and inserting
new§ 114o(a), IO FORDHAM L. REV. 119-(1941).
95
A symposium on alimony appears in 6 L. & CoNTEM. PROB. 183 (1939);
27 VA. L. REv. 914 (1941); 28 KY. L.J. 233 (1940); 5 MoNT. L. REv. 71 (1944);
30 lowA L. REv. 275 (1945); 88 UNiv. PA. L. REV. 880 (1940).
94
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A New Yark court dealt with a statute which gave the court discretion as to alimony in situations where the wife is living habitually with
another man. 96 In the instant case the alimony decree was entered ten
years before the statute was adopted. The court held that alimony
allowed by a final judgment is a vested property right and not affected
by a subsequent statute. It further affirmed the position that absolute divorces and the rights incident to them are purely statutory.
In order to obtain alimony it is generally necessary to prove a marriage. A Georgia court was faced with a demand for alimony to be
paid by a husband under the age of seventeen years. 97 A marriage by
a person of such age is voidable; but the court held that it "must be
treated as void so far as alimony is concerned, unless and until it is
ratified by him after reaching such age" even though the alimony "is
claimed only support of a child."
The need for a valid marriage as a basis for the alimony action is
further emphasized in a Kentucky case. 98 There the wife was married
to another man at the !ime of her marriage to H2. The court held
the second marriage void and refused an allowance of alimony. This
would appear the usual procedure in the absence of a statute.99
Fault of the wife is also generally grounds for refusing requests
for alimony; but even there the courts sometimes make an allowance to
the wife but hesitate to call it alimony. 100 A California court refused
to grant alimony to a wife whom the husband had divorced for cruelty
-treating the divorce decree as final. 101 But a federal court, under a
statute, allowed alimony and custody of children to an adulterous
wife.102
The nature of alimony also is considered in situatio'ns where creditors or others seek to reach the source from which it comes. Bankruptcy cases afford an illustration. A federal court dealt with a bankrupt
wife and held that the divorce decree awarding her a lump sum payable in monthly installments was a final property settlement.1° 3 Consequently, the judgment passed to the trustee. It was not a decree for
payments of future alimony.
96

Waddey v. Waddey, 290 N.Y. 251, 49 N.E. (2d) 8 (1943), noted, 19 IND.
L.J. 162 (1944).
97
Eskew v. Eskew, (Ga. 1945) 34 S.E. (2d) 697.
98
Rose v. Rose, 274 Ky. 208, 118 S.W. (id) 529 (1938), noted, 23 M1NN. L.
REV. 387 (1939).
99
See Bell v. Bell, 122 W.Va. 223, 8 S.E. (2d) 183 (1940), noted, 47 W. VA.
L.Q. 343 (1941).
100 28 KY. L.J. 233 (1940).
101 In re Egeline's Estate, 53 Cal. App. (2d) 368, 127 P. (2d) 948 (1942), noted, 16 So. CAL. L. REv. 353 (1943).
102 Jaeffe v. Jaeffe, (App. D.C. 1941) 124 F. (2d) 233, noted, 30 GEo. L.J.
313 (1942); In re Ruiz' Estate, 53 Cal. App. (2d) 363, 127 P. (2d) 945 (1942).
103 In re Fiorio, (C.C.A. 7th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 562.
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But it is in the field of spendthrift trusts that recent activity is
noticeable. The general policy regarding spendthrift trusts has in some
states been modified by statute: for example allowing a divorced wife
to reach that part of the income of a spendthrift trust over and above
the amount necessary to support the beneficiary.104 The subject received
consideration if not final determination in a Maryland case. 105 The
more conservative point of view was taken by a federal court 106 in refusing to allow the wife to share in the income of the trust. The case
arose in Wisconsin, and, there being no statute and no decision on the
point in that state, the court followed the weight of authority.
In two other cases 101 the question was presented of taxation of the
income of alimony trusts. In the first case W obtained a Nevada divorce incorporating an agreement which provided an irrevocable alimony trust with Was beneficiary. The corpus later was to become hers
absolutely. The court held the trust income not taxable to H.
In the other case W obtained a New York divorce incorporating
an agreement providing for an irrevoc~ble trust composed in part of
bonds. H guaranteed principal and interest. Bec;ause of this and the
fact that he was a party to the New York divorce the court held the
income taxable to him.
As to the factors which the court may take into account in determining the amount of alimony, a Georgia court,108 having regard to the
context, sustained the words "such alimony should be awarded as to
secure to her •the same social standing, the same comforts and luxuries
of life, which she probably would have enjoyed but for the enforced
separation."
1
Matters of procedure are so largely of local concern as scarcely to
warrant inclusion in such a general note as this, but reference to a decision may serve as a reminder of this aspect of the law of alimony.
A California court heard a divorce action in which there was a property settlement but no prayer for alimony.100 H's attorney did not
formally appear. The lower court refused to recogp.ize the property
104 Canfield v. Security Trust National Bank, 8 Cal. App. (2d) 27.7, 48 P. (2d)
133 (1935), noted, IO So. CAL. L. REv. 219 (1937). See also note in 14 TEMPLE
LQ. 2z9 (1940).
105 Bauernschmidt v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 176 Md. 351, 4 A. (2d) 712
.(1939), noted, 4 Mn. L. REv. 417 (1940).
106 Schwager v. Schwager, (C.C.A. 7th, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 754, noted, 29 KY.
L.J. 230 (1941).
107 Fuller v. Helvering, (C.C.A. 2d, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 903; Helvering v.
Leonard, (C.C.A. 2d,. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 900, noted, 19 N.C. L. REv. 94 (1940).
108 Hogan v. Hogan, 196 Ga. 822, 28 S.E. (2d) 74 (1943).
109 Darsie v. Darsie, 49 Cal. App. (2d) 491, 122 P. (2d) 64 (1942), noted,
15 So. CAL. L. REv. 375 (1942). On the problem award of alimony subsequent to
a decree of divorce, see 34 ~Y. L.J. 149 (1946).
,
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settlement agreement but awarded alimony. The court considered a
statute providing in part that the "relief granted_ to the plaintiff if
there be no answer, cannot exceed that which he shall have demanded
in his complaint" and found that it did apply to divorce proceedings.
Consequently, an award of alimony under the present circumstances
was improper.
A North Carolina court decided a question in the field of contempt.
A consent judgment without pleadings was entered providing for installment payments. The order contained, inter alia, the following
provision: "The money payments provided herein shall be more than
a simple judgment for debt. They shall be as effectively binding upon
the plaintiff [ H] as if rendered under and by virtue of the authority
of Section I 667, Consolidated Statutes ...." 1110 The question was
whether the judgment was in reality a judgment for alimony or
whether it was merely an order to pay a debt. If it was the latter the
constitutional provision against imprisonment for debt would prevent
carrying through the punishment for contempt. The majority held
this was a judgment for alimony which in the majority of jurisdictions
in this country may be enforced by contempt.
2. Modification of alimony award. A second major problem in
the field of alimony relates to the principles upon which alimony decrees will be subject to judicial modification. 111
The difficulties encountered by the courts in finding the power to
modify have been lessened in some jurisdictions by statute. A Virginia
court had occasion to assess the significance of that statute.112 The statute adopted ten years ?,fter the decree awarding the alimony purported
to allow modification of alimony "whether the same has been heretofore or hereafter awarded." The court held the act constitutional on
the theory that even a final award of alimony does not create a vested
prqperty right but is merely a perpetuation of H's duty to support W.
Requests for modification, usually based on changed circumstances
are made by both parties. An unusual request appears in a federal
case. 118 The wife asked for an increase, claiming that a federal tax
statute had shifted the burden of the tax from H to W, and that her
request was to be put back in the position she previously occupied. The
court declined, saying that a court of equity does not have power to
adjust tax burdens in a way other than intended by Congress.
110 Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N.C. 181 at 182, 22 S.E. (2d) 576 (1942),
noted, 21 N.C. L. REV. 307 (1943).
.
111 For a general discussion of the topic see 30 IowA L. REv. 275 (1945); 88
UNiv. PA. L. REV. 880 (1940); 6 Mn. L. REv. 238 (1942).
112 Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, IO S.E. (2d) 893 (1940), noted, 27 VA. L.
REv. 415 (1941); 19 N.C. L. REv. 388 (1941).
118 Russell v. Russell, (App. D.C. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 753, noted, 8 UNiv.
DETROIT L.J. 38 (1944).
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An Illinois court dealt with a settlement providing for installments.114 H petitioned for modification when W remarried. The court
expanded the original definition of alimony to include this settlement
in full of all property rights and found that W's remarriage was a
ground for modification.
Alimony in annulment actions has received attention of legal writers in New Y ork. 115
Where the parties have made an agreement regarding support, alimony or property, the question of modification and the rights of the
wife are worthy of ~ttention. In a Massachusetts case 116 the divorce
decree did not mention alimony or incorporate the agreement. The
court later declined to modify, sayirig that its power in this respect was
limited to instances where the agreement is held to be superseded by
the decree of the court. This represents the orthodox reluctance of
courts to disturb an existing decree especially in cases where it is a gross
sum settlement and fair to the wife.
A much more liberal if not extreme view is observable in a New
York case 117 where a lump sum agreement was accepted by W, in the
course of a separation action which was abandoned. She spent the
money, and ten years later, under the New York statute, asked for
support. The court held that the husband's duty to support is a continuing one so that the court at any time may grant alimony where
the consideration for release has been exhausted. Under this holding
it would appear extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a husband to
be released from the duty to support.
Still another substantial step was taken in giving the court power to
modify their decrees in divorce actions when these decrees are based
on agreements between the parties. ·One separation agreement was
adopted by a California court 118 in its decree. H later secured a modification. Still later W sued for the di:ff erence between $200 per month,
as provided in the agreement, and $ roo per month, as required of H
under the modification order. The court held that the agreement,
upon approval and adoption by the court, merged in the decree and
lost its identity. So the modification order is conclusive and W has only
one remedy-under the modification order. Previously the courts
generally allowed W alternate remedies-and of course she naturally
114 Banek v. Banek, 322 Ill. App. 369, 54 N.E. (2d) 577 (1944), noted, 22
' CHI.-KENT L. REv. 276 (1944). See also Winkel v. Winkel, 178 Md. 489, 15 A.
(2d) 914 (1940), noted, 6 Mo. L. REv. 238 (1942).
115 IO FORDHAM L. REV. II9 (1941); 15 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 338 (1941).
116 Sehillander v. Sehillander, 307 Mass. 96, 29 N.E. (2d) 686 (1940), noted,
25 MINN. L. REV. 645 (1941).
117 Kyff v. Kyff, 286 N.Y. 71, 35 N.E. (2d) 655 (1941), noted, II BROOKLYN
L. REv. 106 (1941); 8 CuRRENT LEGAL THOUGHT 107 (1941).
118 Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal. (2d) 605, 160 P. (2d) 15 (1945).
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took the one which promised her the greater return. The holding
appears logical.
A different judicial approach to the same type of problem, though
one far more orthodox, is illustrated by a New York case.119 Here,
also, the separation agreement was embodied in the divorce decree. H
now asks modification. The court held th~t under the New York statute it had the power to modify decrees even though the decree adopted
the agreement. If the agreement stood alone the consent of the parties
would be necessary to change it. This appears to coincide with the majority rule.
One may argue that the emancipation of woman, thanks to legislation and improved social and economic conditions, has advanced to
the point at which the husband's duty to support the wife is no longer
necessary. Following that line of reasoning it would be ,proper to require the. husband to support his minor or disabled children but not
the wife. She in turn might make pre-marital demands for a condition
of economic security by ante-nuptial agreement, by insurance or in
other ways. Once admitting the institution of alimony, however, it
seems clear that behind the rules of law and decisions of the courts
some wives who deserve such aid fail to receive it. Others use the
machinery to annoy their husbands. The idea of an insurance fund
for the purpose, perhaps as part of a social security program, might
result in more money to the wife,. less controversy between husband
and wife and less expense to the taxpayer. How husbands, freed from
this age old legal' duty would react is an-y:one's guess.

F. Property Rights in the Domestic Relations Field
It is impracticable even to attempt a survey of the progress in this
field of property rights. The laws in the various states differ substantially and each jurisdiction deserves a survey of its own. The subject,
however, requires some comment if only to suggest the need for a more
intensive treatment.
r. In common law jurisdictions. Those states which take their
concepts in this field from the common law are still engaged in breaking down one of its fundamental concepts-that husband and wife are
one person. Some of this tendency is indicated in the statutes of which
illustrations are noted.120
Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N.Y. 296, 26 N.E. (2d) 265 (1940), noted, 15
L. REV. I05 (1940).
120 Ala. Gen. Acts (1943) No. 445, p. 408 (wife may lease her lands and tenements without assent and concurrence of her husband); Ark. Acts (1943) No. 69 § 2,
p. IOO (married woman may dispose of any property she may own in her own name
and of her own separate estate; sales and conveyances are validated); Fla. Gen. Laws
(1943) vol. I, c. 21696, p. 82 (wife may become a partner or contract with her husband or another; may give and receive power of attorney to and from her husband,
119

ST.
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The duty of a husband to support his wife and the circumstances
under which he is relieved of that duty appear in several cases. In
Virginia H and W had H's mother in the home. W sued for separate
maintenance on the ground that H was too devoted to his mother and
that the mother exercised constant supervision over W in the home.
The court, confronted with a conflict of temperaments, declined to
order H to pay alimony and stated a general rule that:
"The marital duties of a husband do not require him under
any and all circumstances to support and maintain his wife in a
home separate and ap~rt from other members of his family whom
he is under obligation to support and maintain. . . . a husband
does owe the wife the duty of protection from cruelty and wrong,
and from whatever other danger may threaten her...." 121

At common law .a married woman's contract of suretyship was
void. Under the statutes giving W a: more independent status the
common law has been changed. As an example, a Kentucky statute
read:
"No part of a married woman's estate shall be subjected to
the payment or satisfaction of any liability upon a contract made
after marriage to answer for the debt, default or misdoing of another, including her husband, unless the estate has been set apart
for that purpose by mortgage o'r other conveyance...." 122
including power to execute and acknowledge deeds owned by her or jointly with
husband. Powers of attorney-wife to husband and vice versa-are validated); Fla.
Gen. Laws (1943) vol. I, c. 21932, p. 484 (wife has contractual powers over her
separate property or estate as if unmarried); Idaho Laws (1941) c.• 62, p. 123 (the
law gives some comfort to husbands by allowing them to exercise sovereign contractual
authority over their separate property); La. Acts (1944) No. 286, p. 836 (wife by
written instrument may declare that she reserves all the fruits of paraphernal property
for her own separate use and benefit and her intention to administer such property
separately and alone; instrument to be executed before a notary public and recorded);
Minn. Laws (1943) c. 26, p. 37 (legalizes retroactively all conveyances of real property made bf'one spouse to the other); Neb. Laws (1945) c. IIO, p. 328 (property
of a married woman, with certain exceptions, is made liable for necessaries of life furnished to her or her husband or family); R. I. Acts & Resolves (1944) c. 1397, p. 27
(permits husband and wife to engage in business partnership); Tenn. Pub. Acts (1943)
c. 131, p. 358 (a homestead or real estate when owned by a married woman may be
sold and conveyed by her sole act and deed); Wis. Laws (1944) c. 195,_ p. 303
(recognizes the creation of a joint tenancy in real or personal property by deed, transfer, or assignment from husband to wife or wife to husband). See also, Neuner,
"Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws," 5 LA. L. REv. 167 (1943); Oliver,
"Community Property and the Taxation of Family Income," 20 TEXAS L. REv. 532
(1942).
121 Montgomery v. Montgomery, 183 Va. 96 at 106, 31 S.E. (2d) 284 (1944).
122 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) § 404.010(2).
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This statute obviously provides a method by which W may become
surety.123
•
In Florida a I 943 statute empowered a married woman to contract, to sue, to manage her property, sell and mortgage her property,
and to execute any kind of instrument without joinder by her husband,
and act "in all respects as fully as if she were unmarried."
Until this statute was passed, the promissory notes of married
women executed in Florida were void in Florida. A case involving a
note signed by Hand W came up in the federal court.124 It held the
statute not retroactive.
The statutory obligation of° W to support H is a further step in
the direction of separation of identity. A New York court refused to
apply the statutory duty because of the conduct of H. 125
A federal court in Michigan 126 dealt with an agreement between
H and W by which she was to pay him $ 500 a month until the parties
nb longer desired the agreement. After divorce, H sued W for back
payments. He had given up his employment in order to accompany
her on her travels. The court, applying the more orthodox rule, held
that there was no consideration for the promise by W and, even if
there were, it was contrary to public policy.
2. In community property jurisdictions. In the field of community
property since the statutes vary considerably the most promising approach appears to be to take a few illustrations from each jurisdiction.
California; Under the California statute the courts considered cases
on problems such as the following:
Determining the character of acquired property. H and W owned
land stated in the deeds to be held in joint tenancy. Upon a divorce
the lower court considered the land to be community property, but on
appeal it was held that the only intention showed it to be a joint tenancy.121
In another case 128 W· borrowed money from her brother upon her
unsecured note and purchased land with it. In a divorce suit the note
was overdue. H maintained that the property belonged to the community because of the presumption that attaches to property purchased
with borrowed funds. W contended that the property was conveyed
to her by an instrument in writing which, under the statute, raises a
See 33 KY. L.J. 66 (1944).
Shinn v. McLeod, (D.C. Fla. 1945) 58 F. Supp. 440.
125 Matter of Kittell, 171 Misc. 983, 14 N.Y.S. (2d) 803 (1939), noted, 25
CoRN. L.Q. 300 (1940).
126 Graham v. Graham, (D.C. Mich. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 936, noted, 15 So. CAL.
L. REV. II] (1941).
127 Tomaier v. Tomaier, 50 Cal. App. (2d) 516, 123 P. (2d) 548 (1942).
128 Hogevoll v. Hogevoll, 59 Cal. App. (2d) 188, 138 P. (2d) 693 (1943),
noted, 17 So. CAL. L. REV. 64 (1943).
128
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pr~umption that it was her separate property. The court held that
the presumption from the written instrument is not overcome by evidence that the funds were borrowed. H must also show that there is
no intention to make a gift.
·
In still another case 129 the problem was to divide expectancies of
community property at the time of the divorce. The item causing the
major question was compensation not yet, but to be, received by H
as a member of the Fleet Reserve, U.S.N. The court held it was not
subject to division because it was an expectancy.
· Again the liability of H to support W's indigent parents was considered.130 Here plaintiff sued her married daughter for support. The
daughter, as a housewife, had no separate property; but depended
solely for support upon H. The court found that the statute imposes
no duty on H in such a case and it would not require a division of
the community property for the purpose.
Finally came the matter of testamentary disposition by W. 131 The
money was secured from the operation by H and W of a candy store.
W by will, left her money to a sister. By statute, one-half of the community property is subject to testamentary disposition. The money was
collected prior to 1920 and the statute passed in 1923. The court held ·
the act not retroactive with respect to rents, issues and profits acquired
prior to its passage.
Louisiana. In Louisiana a similar variety of matters required judicial determination. The right of an injured wife to sue for Workmen's
C9mpensation under the statute was upheld on the theory that Workmen's Compensation is personal to and for the benefit of the worker
so long as he is living. It is not like W's wages-a community asset for
which H must sue.132
In another case the right of W to sue in her own name for personal
injuries was not questioned but when she sued for loss of salary sustained as result qf an accident the court held the salary was community property for which H must sue.133
Rights of action between H and W, forbidden at common law, are
permitted under certain circumstances in community property jurisdictions.
129 French v. Fre.nch, 17 Cal. (2d) 775, 112 P. (2d) 235 (1941), noted, 30
CAL. L. REV. 469 ( 1942).
130 Grace v. Carpenter, 42 Cal. App. (:td) 301, 108 P. (2d) 701 (1941).
131 Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. (2d) 613,145 P. (2d) 312 (1944). See also Neuner,
"Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws," 5 LA. L. REv. 167 (1943); Olive"r,
"Community Property and the Taxation of Family Income," 20 TEXAS L. REv. 532
(1942).
'
132 Brownfield v. Southern Amusement Co., 196 La. 73, 198 S. 656 (1940),
noted, 3 LA. L. REv. 641 (1941).
188
Kientz v. Chas. Dennery, Inc., (La. App. 1944) 17 S. (2d) 506, noted, 19
TULANE L. REV, 141 (1944).
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A Louisiana court permitted H during marriage to sue W for
restitution or value of his property wrongfully taken by her.184 The
action was in "quasi" contract.
In a somewhat similar situation H sued W's employer for an injury sustained in an automobile accident. It was objected that any
recovery would fall into the community, half of which is W's property, and that thus she would benefit from her own negligence. The
court, however, held that the recovery merely reimburses the community for a loss it has sustained.
In another case the contest was between W and a creditor of H
for a debt arising before marriage. Land which was community property had been seized and sold in execution against H, and W was attempting to recover. The court held that even though the land was
community property its creditors before marriage could seize it.135
In a tax case it was held that the entire cost of settling a decedent's
estate is deductible from it. One-half is not chargeable to the surviving
spouse because the community terminated at the death of decedent and
was no longer capable of being charged with such expenses.136
Oklahoma. In this state one of the features was the adoption in
1939 of a community property law.187 This act came before the courts
in a tax case 138 and it was held that it was not effective as a means of
dividing the federal income tax liability of Hand W. The court concluded that Oklahoma was originally a common law state-that the
community property act represents a present but not fundamental policy of the state "to permit spouses, by contract, to alter the status which
they would otherwise have under the prevailing property system in the
State. Such legislative permission cannot alter the true nature of what
is done when husband and wife, after marriage, -alter certain of the
incidents of that relation by mutual contract.m39
New Mexico. The court, following a rule in effect in the majority
of community property states, held that the decedent's estate or his
share of the community must bear the expenses of the funeral. 140
Oregon. Legislative attention was given to the subject of community property.141
•
18
¼ Kramer v. Freeman, 198 La. 244, 3 S. (2d) 609 (1941), noted, 16 TULANE
L. REV. 149 (1941).
135
Stafford v. Sumrall, (La. App. 1945) 21 S. (2d) 83, noted, 20 TULANE L.
REv. 136 (1945).
136
Vaccaro v. United States, 4 P.H., 1944 FED. TAX SERV. 1f 62,646, noted,
6 LA. L. REv. 106 (1944).
187
Daggett, "The Oklahoma Community Act," 2 LA. L. REv. 575 (1940).
188
Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 65 S.Ct. 103 (1944).
189
Id. at 46.
140
Langhurst v. Langhurst, 49 N.M. 329, 164 P. (2d) 204 (1945).
141
Ore. Laws (1943) c. 440, p. 656 (providing for the community ownership of
property by husband and wife).
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Texas. The po~er of W to convey her separate property to the
community was the subject of litigation. H conveyed community real
property to W, as her own separate property. Later W deeded the
property to a third person who on the same day deeded it to H and
Was community property. W became insane and the property was
sold at trustees' sale. VV protested the property was hers but the court
found that it was community property. 142
The general rule is that W's statutory rights in the community
estate cannot be altered by an agreement between herself and H to
convert the property into separate property.' An attempted gift of
community property, then, is ineffectual because only separate property
is the subject of gift.
:
Washington. In two cases life insurance was involv~d. In one,148
policy on the life of H, W was named beneficiary but the right
to change beneficiary was reserved. W delivered both policies to H
before the divorce. H then married W2 and named her as beneficiary.
The company made disability payments under the policy to W2. W2
then divorced H and H changed the beneficiary again. The contest was
among the three persons who had been named as beneficiary. The
court favored the third beneficiary. W consented to change of benenciary by delivery of property. W2 was reimbursed by disability payment and after the divorce had no further interest. Since the policy was
property of the community of H and W, it was held, after the dissolution of the marriage, by Hand Was tenants in common; W was
therefore entitled to a share to reimburse her.
Another case 144 also involved a change of beneficiary from W to
his estate. The burt held that H as manager of the community may
change beneficiary but that• the whole of the proceeds are subject as
community property to the community debts. ·

G. Custody of Children
Two major positions are presented in cases involving the custody
of childr~n-what the parent thinks is for the best interest of the child;
and what the court thinks on the same subject.145 Those who read the
opinions in the appellate courts have difficulty in visualizing the background facts from which the judges have made selection of those
142 Taylor v: Hollingsworth, (Texas 1943) 176 S.W. (2d) 733, noted, 22
TEXAs L. REv. 507 (1944).
143 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Skov, (D.C. Ore. 1943) 51 F. Supp. 470,
noted, 18 TULANE L. REV. 487 (1944).
144 In re Towey's Estate, ,22 w;sh. (2d) 212, 155 P. (2d) 273 (1945), noted,
20 WASH. L. REV. 167 (1945).
145 Parental Authority and the Law, 200 L.T. 129 (1945). See also the Symposium, "Children of Divorced Parents," IO LAw AND CoNTEM. PROB. 697 (1944).
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deemed significant. It is possible that another judge faced with the
same background material would select other facts or place a different
emphasis on them. Consequently, while there is much said judicially
about the principles which should limit the discretion of the court, one
should remember that it is only the trial judge who actually sees the
parties. The appellate court tries the case on the record. The legal
scholar or other observer who reads the appellate opinion is even further removed from reality. In cases dealing with the welfare of children this inability to secure first hand information makes it difficult to
discuss the application and effectiveness of the general principles. Consider the following cases:
In the District of Columbia court 140 the court found W guilty of
adultery but gave her custody of two of the three children. In California 147 the holding was that before the court can deprive a mother
of her right to the minor's custody and give the child to strangers there
must be a finding that the mother is an unfit person. These two teststhe unrestricted discretion of court as to what is for the best interests of
the child and the necessity for making a court record of unfitness
against the mother with its consequent effect upon the mind of the
child-present difficult alternatives. "Unfitness" suggests moral unfitness and this may be a factor but not necessarily the only Gne. Perhaps the answer lies, not so much in the choice of words with which to
inscribe the record-a practice dear to the heart of everyone with
legal training,-but rather a more careful selection and more adequate training of those judges who must exercise the discretion. A
government of laws and not of men may have been a traditional goal
of our system of jurisprudence. But, where, as here, discretion is inescapable from an administrative viewpoint, and where every case
differs from every other case, and the facts of no case are likely to
be quite the same two days in succession, rules without the most sensitive discrimination in the application may create lasting injury or hardship to the child.
The problem is not simply where the request to the court is for
modification of a, previous order. Here the orthodox rule is that a
change from that existing at the time of the original order is necessary
to warrant the court in acting. In one case 148 H alleged that W poisoned the minds of the children against him and prayed for a period
of custody. The court found that the petition did not allege that the
146 Jaeffe v. Jaeffe, (App. D.C. 1941) 124 F. (2d) 233, noted, 30 GEo. L.J.
313 (1942).
147 Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. (2d) 141, 152 P. (2d) 999 (1941), noted, 19 So.
CAL. L. REv. 72 (1945).
'
us Fuller v. Fuller, 197 Ga. 719, 30 S.E. (2d) 600 (1944), noted, 7 GA. B.J.
357 (1945).
.
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poisoning was not in progress before or at the time of the divorce decree. It seems that there may have been other considerations in the
mind of the court but if the welfare of the child is the major objective
it is not necessary to make it dependent upon the sufficiency of a
pleading.
When the contending parties are the pa.rents and· a third person
the essential problem remains the same. In a Louisiana case 149 the
child was being cared for properly by his grandparents. The court
placed the burden upon the father of showing the need for the change.
This is somewhat different from the traditional common law rule which
gave the father substantial control over the person of the child.
A ruling more favorable to the rights of the parent is invoked in
another Louisiana case.150 Here the paternal grandmother instituted
proceedings in the juvenile court charging that the child was neglected.
The child's sixteen year old _mother produced as a defense a decree
of the civil court, which also has jurisdiction over children, giving her
custody. The appellate court dismissed the grandmother's claim.
Still another case-this one in Florida-gave the child to the maternal grandparents who had reared him from infancy.151 The language of the court summarizing the environment provided by the
grandparents for the boy has a literary quality.
When the contention is between the natural and adopting parents
the same fundamental issue is presented. In a PennsY.lvania case the
natural parents, who married shortly before the child was born, signed
a contract allowing adopting parents to have custody of-the child for
a year and providing that, at any time during the year, they could
adopt the child. The court found that it was for the child's best interest to be with his natural mother.152
Presumptions that the child is better off with his natural parents
and that the best interests of the child are to be sought provide a basis
for a decree or order. But the process of finding, or perhaps selecting,
the legally significant facts in cases of this sort is not quite the same
as that employed where property matters are before the court. The
report of the probation officer or social case worker reveals more than
the traditional statement of facts in an opinion. Perhaps more cases
should be taken up on appeal so that additional material would be
availaple for attempts at prediction by a harassed bar.
149

State ex rel. Landry v. Robin, 193 La. 789, 192 S. 349 (1939), noted,

:i

L.. L. REV. 561 (1940).
150 In re Sherrill, 206 La. 457, 19 S. (2d) 203 (1944), noted, 19 TULANE
L. REv. 464 (1945).
151 Hart v. Howell, 154 Fla. 878, 19 S. (2d) 317 (1944).
152 Com. ex rel. Piper v. Edberg, 150 Pa. Super. 378, 28 A. (2d) 460 (1942),
noted, 17 TEMPLE L.Q. 103 (1942). See also Petition of Ekendahl, 321 Ill. App.
457, 53 N.E. (2d) 302 (1944), noted, 39 ILL. L. REv. 88 (1944).
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Where the controversy involves domicil of a minor as between two
counties in the same state the same problem arises. In a California
case,158 following a divorce in county A, the child was awarded to the
mother. The father tried without success to have the decree modified
in the same county. Later, while the son was visiting him in county B,
the father started the present case. The county B court was held to
have jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The court interpreted the
statute as conferring jurisdiction upon the court of the county where
the minor is temporarily domiciled or residing. The statute in question
made no reference to jurisdiction, so interpretation was necessary. That
the interpretation followed the traditional view of the welfare of the
child is not surprising, but one wonders at the possibility of two courts
in different counties viewing the facts in different ways.
When the problem is broadened to include conflicts between the
courts of various states this possibility of disagreement is always present.15¼
In a Kentucky case 155 a West Virginia decree gave custody to W.
H took the children to Kentucky before the decree was granted. The
court enforced the foreign decree.
In a Tennessee case 156 an Ohio decree gave custody to W. H fled
to Tennessee with the child before the custody decree in the divorce
action was granted. This decree also gave final custody to W. W, in
Tennessee, brought habeas corpus proceedings to enforce her right to
custody. H contended circumstances had changed and the child's best
interests would be served by allowing him to remain ·in Tennessee.
The court held that the foreign decree was res judicata as between the
parties, subject only to modification by the court granting the decree.
A qualification of this rule is that if the child is in a new state the courts
of that state, upon a showing of a change of circumstances affecting the
best interest of the child, may act. 1'.his is the general view. A minority
viewpoint considers that custody decrees are based upon local concern
and are not affected by principles of comity. Perhaps in an actual case
much the same result would be accomplished under either rule.
A further example of the broad interpretation upon these rules is
in a District of Columbia case.157 Here a California decree awarded custoday to W. H again fled with the child to the District of Columbia.
There the court held that a ·custody decree of a foreign jurisdiction
m In re Burket's Guardianship, 58 Cal. App. (2d} 726, 137 P. (2d) 475
(1943), noted, 17 So. CAL. L. REv. 73 (1943).
154 See 53 HARV. L. REv. 1024 (1940); 29 KY. L.J. IOI (1940).
155 Stafford v. Stafford, 287 Ky. 804, 155 S.W. (2d) 220 '(1941).
156 State ex rel. French v. French, (Tenn. 1945) 188 S.W. (2d} 603, noted,
19 TENN. L. REV. 90 (1945).
157 Langan v. Langan, (App. D.C. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 979, noted, 34 GEo.
L.J. 105 (1945).
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which is subject to modification at any time during the child's minority
and a custody decree of another foreign jurisdiction based solely on
technical, unlawful detention are not entitled to full faith and credit
in the District of Columbia. The child's interest is the major consideration.
One wonders at the effect of this dramatic litigation upon the children themselves. Are they settled when the final decree is signed?
H. Miscellaneous
Two additional decisions are of interest though riot readily classified under 'the foregoing heading. _
.
A California court construed its legitimation statute in such a way
tbat it operated even though neither parent nor child was do.miciled
in -the state at the time of the legitimating acts. 158
A federal court held that a child had sufficient interest in the maintenance of the family to support an action for alienation of affections
against a woman who had enticed away the father. 159 This decision
suggests a reaction against the recently marked legislative policy of
abolishing the right of action for alienation.

I. Conclusion
-Since it appears unlikely that the American Law Institute will
undertake a Restatement of Laws relating to the Family, the next
question is what else can be done. A model code might produce satisfactory minimum standards and serve as a rallying center for discussion and a point of departure. Perhaps even more useful would be a
statement of. some of the underlying principles. If we could agree
upon the point at which the law alone can do a satisfactory piece of
work on behalf of the family and its :members we could tell more
clearly when and where interprofessional cooperation should begin. If
,we could also ascertain the point at which the la'\"f, because of its diminishing effectiveness, should cease to concern itself with the case, the
sister professions might understand ,when and where they should assume complete responsibility. The problem of the family is wider
than the law.
Principles of law in this field require a degree of certainty or no
attorn.ey would venture to predict a cours_e of conduct for his client.
But flexibility in administration is also necessary because of the infinite
variety of individual characteristics in the families and their members
with whom the law deals. To attain and continue to hold this balance
it appears that our objectives, administrative procedure and sanctions
ln re Lund's Estate, 26 Cal. (2d) 472, 159 P. (2d) 643 (1945), noted, 59
L. REV. 128 (1945).
159 Daily v. Parker, (C.C.A. 7th, 1945) 152 F. (2d) 174.
158

HARV.
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need continuing impersonal re-examination in a rapidly and perennially
' changing world. The law in the field of domestic relations is behind
the times. Granting that it may never successfully keep quite abreast
of informed public opinion, too much lag is a factor to be avoided. Some
permanent legislative commission in each state composed of representatives from all groups interested in the subject would appear to be
indicated.
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